Western historical traditions of well-being by Michalos, Alex C. & Weijers, Dan M.
Last Author version. For published version, see http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319391007  
Western Historical Traditions of Wellbeing 
 
Alex C. Michalos and Dan Weijers* 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter provides a brief historical overview of western philosophical 
views about human well-being from the eighth century BCE to the middle of the twentieth 
century. Different understandings of the concept of well-being are explained, including our 
preferred understanding of well-being as the subjective states and objective conditions that make 
our lives go well for us. While this review is necessarily incomplete, we aim to discuss some of 
the most salient and influential contributions to our subject.  To that end, we discuss some key 
views from ancient Greece, including the aristocratic values that were considered central to 
leading a good life, notions of personal and more expansive harmony as they key to well-being, 
and the idea that the experience of pleasure is all we should really care about. We also explain 
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on the importance of personal and public happiness. Finally, we discuss views to the effect that 
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Proverb 
 “What is the highest of all the goods achievable in action?. . .most people. . .call it 
happiness, . . .But they disagree about what happiness is. . .”. 
         Aristotle 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter provides a brief historical overview of western philosophical views about 
human well-being or quality of life from the eighth century BCE to the middle of the twentieth 
century. A comparison of many views discussed here with eastern views described in Joshanloo 
(2014) reveals a number of similarities. However, since there has not been an enormous amount 
of cross-fertilization between eastern and western conceptions of wellbeing, the topics are 
discussed separately in this volume. We present diverse views of a family of well-being concepts 
proceeding from questions about the best sort of life to lead, the best sort of person to be, the 
general world views from which these questions arise, and the best sorts of paths put forward 
leading to the desired goals. Well-being itself is a complex concept, and so the chapter begins by 
explaining how well-being and its cognates are related to one another. Then, we introduce a 
framework for understanding well-being as a broad concept that involves subjective and 
objective qualities of life.  
 The bulk of this chapter is dedicated to presenting a selection of the major notions of 
well-being throughout the known history of the western world. While this review is necessarily 
incomplete, we aim to discuss some of the most salient and influential contributions to our 
subject.  To that end, we discuss some key views from ancient Greece, including the aristocratic 
values that were considered central to leading a good life, notions of personal and more 
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expansive harmony as they key to well-being, and the idea that the experience of pleasure is all 
we should really care about. We also explain some of the major religious conceptions of the 
good life, and their progression through the middle ages and beyond. More recent secular 
conceptions of wellbeing, including several views on the importance of personal and public 
happiness. Finally, we discuss views to the effect that happiness is not enough for the good life 
and that we should strive for loftier goals. 
 
Family of well-being concepts 
 Since at least the fifth century BCE the family of concepts connected to ideas of well-
being has not been a well-defined family. In our relatively brief review, we will show that from 
the earliest recorded writings of the most notable scholars in the western world until the twenty-
first century there has been a wide variety of terms used with an equally wide variety of explicit 
or implicit definitions. Indeed, leading scholars and policymakers continue to disagree about the 
most basic conceptual distinctions, such as whether health is a component of well-being or 
various forms of well-being constitute health (Michalos 1969). For example, the widely cited 
Constitution of the World Health Organization preamble says that “Health is the state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity”. But, there are good reasons for not treating ‘health’ as a synonym of well-being or 
quality of life. In Michalos, Thommasen, Read, Anderson and Zumbo (2005) and Michalos, 
Ramsey, Eberts and Kahlke (2011) there is empirical evidence that most people would not 
identify good health with a good life. Here it is enough to point out that identifyin health with 
well-being or quality of life would mean that it would make no sense to ask “What is the impact 
of health on a person’s quality of life?” And yet, ordinarily, this question makes as much sense 
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as “What is the impact of wealth on a person’s quality of life?” or “Regarding the quality of a 
person’s life, is it more important to be healthy, wealthy, wise or just morally good?”. 
 Recognizing the great variety of meanings assigned to basic terms in research on 
subjective well-being, Diener (2006) tried to bring some order and consistency to standard usage. 
Fifty scholars endorsed his short text. The trouble is that most of those who endorsed it only did 
so when acceptable caveats were added to proposed definitions or characterizations, and there 
were so many caveats that very little order and consistency was brought to the field. Here is an 
example from the “guidelines”. “Happiness has several meanings in popular discourse, as well as 
in the scholarly literature. For example, happiness can mean a general positive mood, a global 
evaluation of life satisfaction, living a good life, or the causes that make people happy, with the 
interpretations depending on the context. For this reason some researchers avoid using the term 
altogether. Scholars in some fields use the term frequently because of its important historical and 
popular roots, whereas scholars in other fields prefer to use more specific terms for the different 
aspects of well-being” (Diener, 2006, pp.viii–ix).  
 Some scholars think that the term ‘subjective well-being’ is more precise than 
‘happiness’. But, an unpublished survey of 74 leading researchers led Robert Cummins to 
conclude that subjective well-being was understood in a wide variety of ways, including 
contradictory ones. Diener (2006, p.viii) noted that “The term well-being is often used instead of 
subjective well-being because it avoids any suggestion that there is something arbitrary or 
unknowable about the concepts involved”. On the other hand (there is almost always another 
hand), some scholars use ‘well-being’ and ‘quality of life’ as rough synonyms. For these 
scholars, the idea of using ‘well-being’ to designate only subjective well-being would be a huge 
mistake because human well-being has many relatively objective as well as subjective features. 
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As Diener (2006, p.ix) wrote, there are scholars who use ‘quality of life’ in a broad sense “to 
include not only the quality of life circumstances, but also the person’s perceptions, thoughts, 
feelings, and reactions to those circumstances”. For these scholars (e.g., Michalos, 2003), ‘well-
being’ and ‘quality of life’ are essentially synonyms, and require subjective and objective 
indicators for adequate measurement. 
In this chapter, ‘well-being’ and ‘quality of life’ are used in this broad sense to mean 
what makes a person’s life go well for them or a groups’ lives go well for them. Therefore, when 
health, happiness or other good features of lives are discussed, we take pains to be clear about 
whether they should be understood as one of many components of well-being, the one and only 
component of well-being, or a synonym for well-being.   
   
A framework for understanding quality of life 
In very broad strokes one may think of the quality (or qualities) of life of an individual or 
community as a function of two variables; the actual conditions of that life and what an 
individual or community makes of those conditions. What a person or community makes of 
those conditions is in turn a function of how the conditions are perceived, what is thought and 
felt about those conditions, what is done, and finally, what consequences follow from what is 
done. People’s perceptions, thoughts, feelings and actions, then, have an impact on their own and 
others’ living conditions. 
 These two main variables (conditions of life and what people make of them), can be 
combined to construct four scenarios which, with a little exaggeration, may be described as 
different kinds of paradise and hell. The scenarios are explained below and the framework is 
depicted in Figure 2.1. 
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1. If people’s living conditions are good, and people accurately perceive and think about 
them, feel good and act appropriately, we may describe that as Real Paradise. 
2. If people’s living conditions are bad, and people accurately perceive and think about 
them, feel bad and act appropriately, we may describe that as Real Hell. 
3. If people’s living conditions are bad, and people inaccurately perceive and/or think about 
them, feel good and act inappropriately, we may describe that as the classical Fool’s 
Paradise. 
4. If people’s living conditions are good, and people inaccurately perceive and/or think 
about them, feel bad and act inappropriately, we may describe that as a Fool’s Hell. 
 
Figure 2.1.  Possible Ways to Describe or Explain Well-Being 
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Given the fragmented remains of many writers considered here, it is impossible to 
rigorously apply this four-fold set of distinctions to everyone’s views. Nevertheless, we will use 
this framework to elucidate the views discussed in this chapter when we think it is appropriate to 
do so. By doing this, it will be easier to understand where various thinkers located the 
determinants of well-being; in our heads or in our circumstances.  
 
Historical records 
Regarding historical records about well-being or the good life, choices must be made 
regarding exactly which records should be included and how they should be interpreted. Since 
literacy rates were very low compared to our contemporary standards, what records we have 
were produced by relatively distinguished, elite individuals. Then as now, such people tended to 
neglect socially disenfranchised groups like women, the poor, the elderly, the young and the 
foreigners. 
 Dover (1974) wrote a fine book dealing with what he called “popular morality” in the 
time of Plato and Aristotle (around 428 to 322 BCE). The historical records he used included “(i) 
forensic oratory; (ii) political oratory; (iii) drama and epideictic oratory: (iv) epitaphs and 
dedicatory epigrams”. He deliberately omitted any discussion of philosophical works except for 
occasional remarks made by philosophers in which the masses of ordinary people were 
characterized. In general, he thought (probably correctly) that philosophers tended to talk mainly 
to other philosophers and mainly about relatively theoretical issues concerning a good life, while 
authors from the four categories just noted more often talked to more ordinary people in less 
theoretical language. One could not expect that the characterizations of authors in the four 
groups were always more accurate than those of philosophers because, after all, dramatists, 
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lawyers and politicians wrote for effect, often creating fictional characters and events designed to 
impress or persuade others. Granting the differences in historical records used and the pictures 
painted by diverse groups of authors, in this chapter we have drawn mainly on the work of a 
highly salient, influential set of philosophers because, in principle at least, philosophers aim to 
discover and say what is true whether or not it is particularly impressive or persuasive. These 
things are not necessarily exclusive, but we are following the footsteps of those whose aims are 
most similar to our own. 
 Readers should also beware that the literature review that follows is incomplete and it is 
based on incomplete and imperfect sources. For example, in many cases we only have fragments 
to go on, and many of those fragments are likely to have been translated from a paraphrase of a 
quotation that was based entirely on hearsay. Indeed, were it not for the excellent analyses of 
scholars like McKirahan (1994), McMahon (2006; 2013) and others cited here, this overview 
would have been greatly impoverished, especially in regards to the views of the ancients. Finally, 
some passages on the ancient philosophers in this treatise have been adapted from Michalos and 
Robinson (2012). 
 
Major conceptualizations 
 In this section we review some major conceptualizations of a “good life”, “the good life”, 
“the quality of life”, “happiness” or “well-being” from the western historical tradition. Specific 
examples of scholarly writings illustrating each conceptualization are provided. We begin by 
discussing ancient views of well-being, drawn mainly from before and around the times of 
Socrates in ancient Greece. This discussion is focused on the aristocratic values that were 
considered central to leading a good life, notions of personal and more expansive harmony as 
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they key to well-being, and the idea that the experience of pleasure is all we should really care 
about. Next, we explain religious conceptions of the good life, and their progression through the 
middle ages and beyond. Then, we discuss secular conceptions of wellbeing, including several 
views on the importance of personal and public happiness. Finally, we discuss views to the effect 
that happiness is not enough for the good life and that we should strive for loftier goals. 
 
 Aristocratic values 
 Among the writers of the Archaic Age (c. 750–480 BCE), questions about the best life 
for an individual, or about the best kind of person to be, had paramount importance. The heroes 
of the epic poems ascribed to Homer (eighth century BCE), the Iliad and the Odyssey, lived in 
societies governed by hereditary monarchies with the support of members of the aristocracy. 
They were larger than life characters, born to and raised in privileged, noble and wealthy 
families, occasionally boasting gods or goddesses in their family trees, displaying physical 
attractiveness and dexterity, as well as the qualities of practically wise leadership, strength of 
character, courage, justice, generosity and piety. These are the characteristics and values of those 
aristocrats. The best kind of people were aristocrats and the best kind of life was aristocratic. 
Enjoying all the advantages of nobility, such people would have a clear sense of noblesse oblige 
and act accordingly.  
It is important to note that while the characters and the general background stories that 
Homer was working with were inherited from centuries before (composed in a much more 
straightforwardly aristocratic time), Homer himself was writing at a time when there was social 
transitioning to more democratic values. In Homer’s time, people’s vision of a good life began to 
change from that of competitive to cooperative success.  “. . .the various strands of the Homeric 
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heroic ideal began to unravel. In particular, good birth, wealth, and fighting ability no longer 
automatically went together. This sort of situation forced the issue: what are the best qualities we 
can possess? What constitutes human arete [i.e., excellence, virtue or goodness]? The literary 
sources contain conflicting claims about the best life for a person, the best kind of person to be, 
and the relative merits of qualities thought to be ingredients of human happiness” (McKirahan, 
1994, p.358).  
  The poems of Hesiod of Ascra (late eighth/early seventh century BCE) provide 
assessments of what is good or bad. In his Works and Days, along with some references to the 
deities Peace, Famine and Disaster, readers are offered themes of the good life that are familiar 
and still attractive, i.e., flourishing and prosperous communities, populated by honest people, 
living in peace, enjoying the fruits of their labour, without worries about where the next meal 
will come from, with an absence of disease and with justice for all.  Later in the same poem 
Hesiod describes the antithesis of a good society through a kind of inversion of these themes. In 
contemporary terms, one might say that Hesiod’s bad society is one in which the institution of 
morality has been totally undermined, including people’s sense of justice, resulting in the total 
destruction of its social capital.    
  
 Harmony 
 Harmony (harmonia) is probably the most frequently mentioned preferred feature of a 
good life in the 550–250 BCE period. Joshanloo (2014, p.477) remarks that “One of the 
fundamental differences in western and eastern notions of happiness and a good life is that in the 
former, attempting to change, master, and control the world (including various aspects of one’s 
life, relationships, and nature) is praised, whereas in the latter, adjustment to the environment, 
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achieving harmony with others and the cosmos is prioritized”. If one compares contemporary 
western psychological theory with eastern philosophical theories, as Joshanloo did, the particular 
difference he describes in this passage is accurate. However, a comparison between western 
ancient philosophical theories with eastern philosophical theories, reveals that diverse forms of 
harmony are common to both traditions.  
We have already seen it in the poets’ references to peace. It appears in a variety of forms 
from most of the important philosophers across the whole period. In fact, the International 
Olympic Committee (2007, p.12) announced that one of its Fundamental Principles is “The goal 
of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view 
to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity”. Below are 
nine views about harmony in some sense and a life of good quality. Briefly, the nine views are as 
follows: (1) a soul’s harmony within itself, (2) harmony among the nature of one’s species, 
nature in general and ideal law, (3) harmony as blending daimones with a Supreme Being, (4)  a 
harmonious balance among individuals’ internal atoms and the external atoms of his or her 
environment, (5) a harmonious balance among an individual’s particular constitution, humors, 
diets, exercises, geography, seasonal climates, heavenly bodies and government, (6) a 
harmonious combination of well-ordered souls in well-ordered cities, (7) ascetic harmony with 
nature, (8) a harmonious mixture of an active life with goods of the soul, goods of the body and 
external goods, and (9) harmony with nature through virtuous action. 
 
Soul’s harmony with itself 
Pythagoras of Samos (c.570–c.490 BCE imagined that the universe, which he called the 
kosmos, was an “intelligible, ordered whole” somehow held together or connected by harmonia, 
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i.e., by some sort of principle of harmony, which he had shown was intimately related to 
numerical analysis (McKirahan, 1994, p.115). He apparently believed that all animals have 
immortal souls which at death transmigrate among diverse species, trading up or down as it 
were, depending partly on each individual’s behavior and character. The aim of the relatively 
ascetic Pythagorean “way of life” was to bring increased harmony to an individual’s soul, 
thereby improving that individual’s chances for trading up rather than down in the next life. The 
good life we seek is the unobservable harmony of that unobservable entity, the immortal soul. 
This notion of a harmonious soul or a soul at peace with itself is to some extent a feature of our 
contemporary popular psychology revealed in remarks about people having or needing to “get it 
all together”, “pull themselves together” and “getting your heart and head together”.  
 
Harmony among the nature of one’s species, nature in general and ideal law 
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.540–c.480 BCE) posited a world constantly undergoing changes 
while preserving identities, e.g., the Nile River remains the Nile River across time while its 
waters undergo continuous change.  For any of his contemporaries interested in defining “the” 
good life, the descriptive and evaluative relativism of some of his fragments would have been 
deeply disturbing. Possibly the most disturbing of all would have been this one: “to God all 
things are beautiful and good and just, but humans have supposed some unjust and others just” 
(McKirahan, 1994, p.125).  
The good life is one lived in communities in which people willingly follow customs and 
obey conventional laws that are consistent with an ideal law sometimes referred to as “the divine 
law”.  By linking behavior that is appropriate to the conditions of the world and to one’s own 
nature with ideal law, Heraclitus was perhaps the first ancient philosopher to articulate the basic 
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premise of ethical naturalism (Michalos, 1981). The harmony he sought was not merely within a 
person’s soul, but among a person’s nature, the nature of the world and a universal ideal law.  
 
Harmony as blending daimones with a Supreme Being 
According to Empedocles of Acragas (c.492–c.432 BCE) human bodies were supposed 
to be wrapped around daimones as “an alien garb of flesh”. The daimones animating such bodies 
function like souls but have a special status which is grander than souls.  ‘Love’ and ‘Strife’ are 
names used to describe cosmic forces that are not only physical, but psychological and moral as 
well. Love is sometimes referred to as Friendship, Joy and Harmony. Love, friendship, harmony, 
peace, social-esteem and self-esteem, and joy are all positively valued, while strife, quarrels, 
murder, war and “human distress” are all negative. Most importantly, Love is a cosmic force that 
brings together the four elements (earth, air, fire and water) in a kind of orchestrated harmony 
producing a world in which daimones are blended with a Supreme Being. 
 
Harmonious balance among individuals’ internal atoms and the external atoms of his or her 
environment 
According to Democritus of Abdera (c.460–c.370 BCE), the ultimate material building 
blocks of the universe were atoms, which were too small to be observed by human senses but 
were theoretically imagined to be unlimited in number, shape and size, and to be constantly in 
motion in an unlimited void. Human beings were thought to be unique clusters of compounds 
consisting of body and soul atoms which were equally material. According to his theory, good 
health was a function of a kind of “dynamic equilibrium” or harmonious balance among the 
internal atoms of an individual and the external atoms of his or her environment. In short, all 
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observable mental and physical disorders could be explained by unobservable disordered and 
discordant atomic activity, while observable human well-being could be explained by 
unobservable orderly and harmonious atomic activity. The Real Paradise that one aimed for 
required a harmonious balance among individuals’ internal atoms and the external atoms of his 
or her environment.  
Democritus was the first philosopher to recommend downward comparisons as part of a 
strategy for attaining happiness i.e., judge your well-being by comparing yourself to someone 
worse off. (Kahn, 1998, pp.34–35). Insofar as he believed that this strategy was based on some 
aspect of human nature, Democritus’ view should also be regarded as an ancient root of 
downward comparison theory as elucidated, for example, in Wills (1981).  Since this theory is a 
species of the more generic social comparison theory (Merton & Kitt, 1950), Democritus may be 
considered a pioneer of the latter as well. With social comparison, the idea is that you should 
judge your well-being by comparing yourself to average people like yourself or to people in 
general. 
 
Harmonious balance among an individual’s particular constitution, humours, diets, exercises, 
geography, seasonal climates, heavenly bodies and government 
 The views of the Father of Medicine, Hippocrates of Cos (c.450–c.380 BCE), about the 
nature of well-being and ill-being are buried among the conflicting views of a variety of authors 
of the 60 books included in what is now called the ‘Hippocratic Corpus’ (hereafter Corpus). 
There was no agreement on how many essential elementary building blocks the world required. 
Options ran from Thales’s single watery substance to Democritus’s infinite number of atoms and 
the void. Several authors of the Corpus drew on the work of Empedocles, especially his idea that 
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the basic building blocks of the world were the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. These 
“cosmic elements” were supposed to be connected to four fluids called ‘humors’, fire to yellow 
bile, air to blood, water to phlegm and earth to black bile. 
 In short, in contemporary terms, one could say that the body of a man or woman was 
imagined to be like a cake whose appearance, texture, taste and nutritional value depended upon 
each ingredient being of the right amount and proportionate to all other ingredients, blending 
together into the whole cake in accordance with nature’s design. The default position of a human 
being was a disease-free, healthy human being, “the greatest human blessing” according to one 
author of the Corpus. Emphasizing again the themes of harmony and balance, departures from 
health were the result of departures from our natural formation and functions. It is a wonderfully 
optimistic view of the natural state of things, a state offering a quality of life that would be 
absolutely at odds with the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” life of one in the state of 
nature imagined by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). A good life required a Harmonious balance 
among an individual’s particular constitution, humors, diets, exercises, geography, seasonal 
climates, heavenly bodies and government 
 Because of the complexity of individuals’ constitutions, diversity of foods, seasons, 
ailments and so on, it was impossible to find successful treatments without “some measure”. As 
some contemporary proponents of subjective well-being indicators and/or health-related quality 
of life measures might have written today, “. . .no measure, neither number nor weight, by 
reference to which knowledge can be made exact, can be found except bodily feeling [i.e., 
patients’ self-reports ]” (Hippocrates, 1923, p.27). 
 
Harmonious combination of well-ordered souls in well-ordered cities 
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Plato of Athens (427–347 BCE) is probably best known for his magnum opus the 
Republic. The central questions of the Republic are concerned with the nature of the best sort of 
life to live, the good life, “the life that for each of us would make living most worthwhile” (Plato, 
1930, p.71) and more precisely, whether “the life of the just man is more profitable” than that of 
the unjust man (p.83) or “whether it is. . .true that the just have a better life than the unjust and 
are happier” (p.101).  
On the analogy of the nature of justice in the city given the city’s structure and functions, 
he concluded that justice in the human soul must occur when “each part is doing its own work” 
and the rational part is allowed to rule, “since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf 
of the whole soul, and for the spirited part to obey and be its ally” (p.117). Justice in the city and 
in the human soul is the great harmonizer, bringing disparate parts together so that they  become 
“entirely one, moderate and harmonious”, and injustice is “a kind of civil war between the three 
parts” (p.119). Such is the interdependent relationship between an ideal city and an ideal 
individual that it is impossible for the latter to exist apart from the former. Human well-being in 
constituted by the harmonious combination of well-ordered souls in well-ordered cities. This is 
about as much of a reconciliation between the interests of any individual and the public interest, 
self and other, as one could hope to have. 
 
Ascetic harmony with nature 
 Diogenes of Sinope (c.400–c.323 BCE) believed that the best life was that lived 
according to, recommended by or in harmony with, nature. Such a life would be a life lived well, 
thriving on virtue and enjoying happiness (Diogenes Laertius, 2000b, pp.67, 73).  His most 
frequently used model for living according to nature is the familiar behavior of stray dogs. Such 
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animals could flourish, apparently with the blessing of the gods, by eating, drinking, grooming, 
urinating, defecating and copulating in public without shame. So, contrary to conventional 
understanding, he thought human beings should be able to shamelessly engage in the same sort 
of behavior. According to Diogenes Laertius (2000b, p.109), Diogenes “used to say that it was 
the privilege of the gods to need nothing and of god-like men to want but little”.  He would have 
argued that if the gods are worthy of admiration and emulation, and they are without needs and 
wants, then a person desiring to become more god-like ought to (morally and prudentially) try to 
eliminate his or her needs and wants. The world is full of animals that apparently live 
comfortable and happy lives by living in conformity or harmony with nature doing what comes 
naturally to them, without any socially constructed conventions. So this is how people should 
live, i.e. in an Ascetic harmony with nature.  
 
Harmonious mixture of an active life with goods of the soul, goods of the body and external 
goods 
 Aristotle of Stageira (384–322 BCE) accepted the common sense understanding that a 
good life required as a determinant and/or a constituent “internal goods. . .of mind and body” and 
“external goods . . .[like] noble birth, friends, wealth, honor”. “To these”, he wrote “we think 
should be added certain capacities and good luck; for on these conditions life will be perfectly 
secure”. Goods of the mind include things like wisdom, temperance, courage, justice and 
pleasure, while goods of the body include things like health, beauty, strength, athletic talent, and 
a long life with a good old age (Aristotle, 1926, pp.47–49).  
 Answering the question “What is the highest of all the goods achievable in action?”, 
Aristotle famously wrote  “As far as the name goes, most people virtually agree; for both the 
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many and the cultivated call it happiness [eudaimonia], and they suppose that living well and 
doing well are the same as being happy. But they disagree about what happiness is, and the many 
do not give the same answer as the wise” (Aristotle, 1999, p.3). 
 Regarding “living well”, Irwin (Aristotle, 1999, p.175) wrote that it had the sense of 
“having a good life” and it was intended to capture the idea that eudaimonia “involves one’s life 
as a whole”. Aristotle “did not find it natural to speak of someone being eudaimonfor a few 
minutes and then ceasing to be eudaimon”, i.e., ‘happiness’ did not designate a pleasant mood as 
it often does nowadays. Rackham (Aristotle, 1934, p.10) remarked that his translation of 
“eudaimonia can hardly be avoided, but it would perhaps be more accurately rendered by ‘Well-
being’ or ‘Prosperity’; and it will be found that the writer [Aristotle] does not interpret it as a 
state of feeling but as a kind of activity”. 
Regarding “doing well” [eu prattein], according to Irwin, Aristotle is saying that 
“eudaimonia. . .consists in action”. Alternative English expressions are “acting well” or “faring 
well”. Much like the ordinary English expression, ‘doing well’ can be used in an active sense as 
in ‘A job worth doing is worth doing well.’ or in a passive sense as in ‘Generally, I am doing 
well, all things considered.’.  In the contexts we are looking at, it is the active sense of ‘doing 
well’ that Aristotle intends. The importance of Aristotle’s assumption that happiness involves 
life as a whole has particular significance for contemporary scholars. Since the most frequently 
studied and measured aspect of people’s lives in quality of life research  over the past 30 years 
has been satisfaction or happiness with life as a whole (Michalos, 2005), we seem to have been 
following a very old and distinguished tradition. There is, however, a difference in the 
connotation of “life as a whole” for the ancients and us. For the ancients, the phrase is used to 
provoke reflection on the whole of one’s life from birth to death, while for us, it is used primarily 
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to provoke reflection on all the salient domains or features of one’s life as currently lived. It is 
possible that some respondents would mix the ancient with the contemporary connotation of “life 
as a whole” and craft their responses to our question based on a somewhat different array of 
things from birth to death, but I do not recall seeing any evidence of this.  
All things considered, Aristotle’s characterization of a good or happy life is the clearest 
example we have from the ancients of the view that the quality of a person’s, or of a 
community’s, life is a function of the actual conditions of that life and what a person or 
community makes of those conditions. Conceptually, he could clearly distinguish Real Paradise 
and Hell from a Fool’s Paradise and Hell. Most importantly, he regarded human action as 
essential. A good or happy life is not simply given by nature, God or gods. It requires internal 
and external gifts and good luck beyond our control, but it also requires individual and 
communal initiative. A good or happy life, according to Aristotle, consists of a harmonious 
mixture of internal and external goods in the first place, and regarding the former, an equally 
harmonious mixture of reason, appetite and emotion.  
 
Harmony with nature through virtue 
 Zeno of Citium (c.333–261 BCE) was the founder of the philosophy of Stoicism. For 
Stoics, “An animal’s first impulse. . . is self-preservation” and “pleasure. . .[is] a by-product. . .an 
aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom”. Plants and 
animals are by nature disposed to behave in ways that contribute to their well-being. Human 
beings possess reason and “for them life according reason rightly becomes the natural life”. For 
Zeno, the proper end for humans was described as “life in agreement with nature (or living 
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agreeably to nature) which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which 
nature guides us” (Diogenes Laertius, 2000b, pp.193–195).  
 In these passages we find the ethical naturalism of the Stoics in plain view, proceeding 
from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’. The word “nature” is used in both a descriptive and an evaluative 
sense. We are by nature disposed to behave in certain ways to promote the well-being of 
ourselves and the universe, and we ought to live virtuously or excellently to achieve the aims 
assigned to us by nature. The good life we seek involves living in harmony with nature through 
virtuous action. 
 In a  passage attributed directly to the Stoic Chrysippus (c.280–c.207 BCE) from his book 
On the Means of Livelihood, the philosopher boldly wrote that “virtue in itself is sufficient to 
constitute happiness” (Diogenes Laertius, 2000b, pp.297-299). Quite generally, our translator, 
R.D. Hicks, treated ‘virtue’, ‘well-being’ and ‘happiness’ as synonyms, while ‘health’ is treated 
as designating a more specific additional thing. Apparently, because a virtuous person knows 
what is good and what is evil, is disposed to and will choose what is good, such a person will 
inevitably find happiness. Finding happiness, then, implies that one is happy. 
 The most troublesome feature of Stoic views about goods concerns their treatment of 
things that they regard as morally “Neutral (neither good nor evil)” and thus “indifferent” or 
“morally indifferent” but nevertheless have value and are to be “preferred” because “they are 
typically appropriate, fitting or suitable for us [as rational agents]” (Baltzly, 2004, p.10).  Many 
people might grant that moral virtue cannot be measured against or traded off with non-moral 
virtue. For example, such people would say that someone’s excellence (i.e., non-moral virtue) at 
mathematics or painting cannot be used as a plausible reason for allowing him or her to escape 
condemnation for the morally wrong (i.e., morally evil) act of killing an innocent person.  Others 
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might be willing to allow people who are extra-ordinarily brilliant at something to get away with 
moral indiscretions.  Comprehensive indexes of the quality of life or human well-being are called 
‘compensatory’ if they allow all kinds of virtues or goods to be traded off against all other kinds 
of goods and evils, and in fact most indexes developed over the past 50 years are compensatory. 
The Stoics considered here would have rejected such indexes. 
 
Pleasure 
 As a determinant and/or constituent, pleasure in various forms is included or at 
least discussed in practically all accounts of a good life coming from the 550–250 BCE period. 
Below we will describe four views: (1) a life of personal pleasure regardless of its impact on 
others, (2) a life of measured pleasures exceeding pains, (3) a life filled with experiences of 
particular, transient pleasures, and (4) pleasure in the form of peace of mind and a healthy body. 
`McKirahan (1994, p.396) considered Antiphon of Rhamnous (c. 480–411 BCE) as 
“possibly the earliest advocate of hedonism in Greek philosophy”, i.e., the first recorded 
philosopher to regard the pursuit of pleasure or a pleasurable life as the final end (telos) or good 
life for humans.    
Provided that things are “thought of correctly”, he claimed, what is pleasant is naturally, 
universally life-enhancing and what is painful is life-destroying.  More precisely, provided that 
one thinks “correctly”, one’s experiences of pleasure and pain ought to be regarded as nature’s 
reliable guides to appropriate human action.  So, the best sort of person will make careful and 
accurate observations of nature, think “correctly” about what causes “distress” and “joy”, 
successfully apprehend nature’s guides to a long and pleasant life, and scrupulously follow those 
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guides. Consequently, such a person will enjoy the best sort of life, i.e., a life filled with personal 
pleasure. 
 Protagoras of Abdera (c.490–c.420 BCE) was well-known for his skeptical relativism and 
agnosticism. Of the few fragments reliably attributed to him, the most famous is “A human being 
is the measure of all things – of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they 
are not” (McKirahan, 1994, p.379). While we have seen elements of skeptical relativism in 
fragments attributed to philosophers before Protagoras (e.g., in Heraclitus), this fragment is a 
particularly bold statement of the relativity of all assertions, including those concerning what is 
just or unjust, beautiful or ugly, and even true or false. 
 Combined with the idea that whatever is experienced as pleasant is life-enhancing and 
whatever is experienced as painful is life-destroying, such principles suggest that the best life 
and the best sort of person to be are entirely dependent on individual preferences guided by 
experienced and anticipated pleasures and pains. Among pleasures and pains, Plato’s protagonist 
Socrates thought that variations could only be assessed “when the one is greater and the other 
smaller, or when there are more on one side and fewer on the other” (Plato, 1924, p.237). So, for 
example, weighing pleasures and pains, one would naturally prefer greater and/or more pleasures 
to smaller and/or fewer pleasures and the latter to pains of any size or numbers. He did not 
suggest that people should calculate what we now call ‘discount rates’ according to which the 
proverbial bird in hand might be worth two or more in the bush, but he did observe that 
regarding “size”, “thickness and number” and “sounds” things appear “greater when near and 
smaller when distant” (p.239).  To address this problem, he recommended precise measurement. 
In language that would have warmed the hearts of hedonists from Bentham (2000) to Kahneman 
(1999) (not to mention number-crunching social indicators researchers), he wrote, “Now if our 
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welfare consisted in doing and choosing things of large dimensions, and avoiding and not doing 
those of small, what would be our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement, or the 
power of appearance? Is it not the latter that leads us astray. . . Would men acknowledge, in view 
of all this, that the art which saves our life is measurement, . . .[indeed, not merely measurement 
but] knowledge of measurement, . . .the salvation of our life depends on making a right choice of 
pleasure and pain – of the more and the fewer, the greater and the smaller, and the nearer and the 
remoter – is it not evident. . .” (Plato, 1924, pp.239–241). 
Creating space for faulty appearances versus reality, these remarks clearly reveal an 
appreciation of the differences between a Fool’s Paradise or Hell and the real things. Of course, 
there is nothing here about applying measurement to produce the greatest net pleasure, happiness 
or good for the greatest number as in the utilitarians Bentham (2000) and Mill (1957) but a 
clearer defense of the role of “knowledge of measurement” in the pursuit of pleasure and a good 
life could not have been made. The good life is a life lived with measured pleasures greater than 
measured pains. 
 Aristippus of Cyrene (“the Elder”, c.436–356 BCE) was the founder of the Cyrenaic 
philosophy. Cyrenaics had a radically subjectivist view of knowledge. They believed that all our 
knowledge comes from transient experienced affections which are unique and infallibly 
perceived by each individual. Thus, the only sort of well-being or ill-being they could imagine 
would be subjective well-being or ill-being, and the ideas of a Fool’s Paradise or Fool’s Hell 
would make no sense to them.  
Since the Cyrenaics believed that their knowledge was limited to transitory experiences 
or affections and that, so far as they knew, there were no essential natures, they saw no point in 
reflecting on life as a whole and no point in trying to conduct their affairs in the interest of 
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achieving the end supremely identified by those natures. So far as they were concerned, the only 
end that was intrinsically valuable and achievable was pleasure, not some sort of abstract, 
generic pleasure, but concrete, particular pleasures of the sort we all experience. Hence, one 
might say that the epistemological views of Cyrenaics obliged them to pursue a good time rather 
than a good life because the latter presumed that there are relatively long-lasting personal selves 
existing across time, selves of which they had no evidence. For Cyrenaics, a good life was 
simply a life filled with particular, pleasant and transient experiences. 
Given their epistemological views, they could not have any confidence in the existence of 
or see any value in past or future pleasures. For them, the proverbial bird in hand was not worth 
two in the bush, discounting an unobservable bird’s value by 50%. For Cyrenaics, the discount 
value of birds in the bush, in the past or future, was 100%.  
 The idea that “happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures” of one sort or another 
has been explored in the past 20 years under various names, e.g., affective happiness (Helliwell, 
Layard, & Sachs, 2012), momentary happiness (Howell, Chenot, Hill, & Howell, 2011) hedonia 
(Deci & Ryan, 2008), hedonic enjoyment (Waterman, Schwartz, & Conti, 2008, hedonic 
happiness (Seligman, 2002) and objective happiness (Kahneman, 1999). The pleasures are 
typically regarded as time-limited or transitory and somehow connected to particular feelings or 
experiences. While there do not seem to be any contemporary researchers who would follow the 
Cyrenaics in disregarding other views of happiness, momentary happiness seems to be regarded 
as a legitimate species worthy of continued research.  
Epicurus of Samos (c.341–271 BCE) believed that the chief end or aim of human beings 
was peace of mind or tranquility and a healthy body. For present purposes what has to be 
emphasized is that he regarded scientific knowledge and methods as the essential vehicles for the 
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journey to peace of mind and a healthy body. As in Democritus, Epicurus believed that both 
human bodies and souls are composites of different sorts of atoms and when people die their 
atoms are totally dispersed.  
 The peace of mind or tranquility that Epicurus insisted was the final aim for humans was 
in some ways similar to and in others different from all those who came before him. Diogenes 
Laertius (2000b, p.543) said that “in his correspondence” Epicurus “replaces the usual greeting, 
‘I wish you joy,’ by wishes for welfare and right living, ‘May you do well’ and ‘Live well’”. 
This is practically the same language we saw Aristotle using earlier, i.e., “the many and the 
cultivated. . .suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy”. Aristotle’s 
emphasis on “internal goods. . .of mind and body” and “external goods” like “wealth and honor” 
is similar to views expressed by Epicurus. 
 What, then, is the nature and role of pleasure in the good life envisioned by Epicurus? We 
have seen that Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus often refer to the final aim or end of life as 
happiness, although the happiness they are referring to is not exactly the same thing. On the role 
of pleasure, there appears to be a fundamental difference between the views of Plato and 
Aristotle on the one hand and Epicurus on the other. For the former, pleasure was at best a 
“handmaiden to virtue” and never the final goal. However, in his Letter to Monoeceus Epicurus 
claimed that: “We call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and 
kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come 
back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing.” (Diogenes 
Laertius, 2000b, p.655) In short, for Epicurus, the good life is a life filled with peace of mind and 
good health. 
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 The clear implication of Epicurus’ remark that “By pleasure we mean the absence pain in 
the body and of trouble in the soul” is that, contrary to the views of Socrates and Plato, there is 
no neutral point between pleasure and pain. So far as the latter exists, the former does not, and 
vice versa. Since people are not always in pain, they must sometimes experience pleasure. 
What’s more, one of Epicurus’ Authorized Doctrines says that “The magnitude of pleasure 
reaches its limit in the removal of all pain” (Diogenes Laertius, 2000b, p.665). For example, once 
one’s hunger or thirst are satisfied with food or drink, the pain of wanting both is removed, 
leaving one in a state of pleasure. If the pain of wanting anything at all, mentally or physically, is 
removed, then one’s life would be “complete and perfect”. Once one experiences freedom from 
physical and mental pain, that is as good as it gets. Just as one has no interest in eating more or 
drinking more when one’s hunger and thirst are satisfied, one should have no interest in living 
more because extending the length of time one is in the state of being free of physical and mental 
pain will not make it more pleasurable. It can only bring more of the same. If nothing else, this is 
a very hardy view of human mortality.  
 
Religion 
Against the prevailing Ancient Greek view that one’s well-being depends entirely on the 
will of the gods, most of the foregoing thinkers recast well-being as something that individuals 
could influence through purposeful actions. But, the extent to which one’s well-being could be 
influenced was still limited by luck (not everyone lives in paradise), and the actions required to 
achieve well-being were often too onerous to consistently perform throughout one’s life 
(maintaining one’s virtue while on the rack is doubtless no easy task). The combination of these 
two stark features of reality, which persisted through classical antiquity and have only begun to 
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fade to any noticeable degree in recent years, provided space for a new view of well-being that 
continues to fill that lacuna. The rise of Christianity during the final stages and collapse of the 
Roman Empire popularized the views that true well-being was spiritual well-being, and that this 
was only available in Heaven (McMahon, 2013).  
In this section, the following religious views of well-being are discussed. That true well-
being is full possession of God, something that is only available in Heaven (Augustine). That in 
addition to true well-being in heaven, those who follow the religious path toward God will enjoy 
similar but less exalted experiences on Earth (Aquinas). And, the view that, while true well-
being resides only in heaven, Earthly well-being is characterized by the pleasant satisfaction of 
our desires (Locke). 
 
Otherworldly happiness as true happiness 
 Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) argued that otherworldly happiness was true 
well-being. Augustine synthesized the philosophy of Plato and other Ancient Greeks with the 
Christian thought of his time. As a result, he played an important role in shaping western 
philosophy, Catholicism, and western conceptions of the good life throughout the middle ages 
and, to a lesser extent, even today. Much like Plato, Augustine argued that wisdom was the key 
to well-being. But, unlike Plato, Augustine thought that wisdom came from God, and that hoping 
to live a good life on Earth was ill-advised. Indeed, Augustine derided “philosophers [who] have 
wished, with amazing folly, to be happy here on Earth and to achieve bliss by their own efforts” 
because he believed that our original sin prevented us from experiencing any kind of happiness 
on Earth, and that “true happiness” was only available in Heaven after we die (Augustine, 1984, 
p.852). Wisdom was the key to well-being for Augustine because he thought it keeps our souls in 
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equilibrium by steering them away from the transient earthly goods of riches and power, and 
towards God by encouraging us to live in accordance with His will (Augustine 1948). In essence, 
if you strive to reach God you will be happy because you will be wise enough to want nothing 
more than your wisdom, and you will know you are on the path to true happiness (full possession 
of God) in Heaven. 
In some ways, viewing the best kind of life—true happiness—as being only available in 
Heaven seems likely to relieve some of the tensions that the Ancient Greeks might have 
experienced. Consider that Augustine’s view of well-being explains why life was so hard during 
the living of it, while simultaneously providing hope for living the good afterlife. Moreover, 
living a life in accordance with God’s wishes—the path to God’s kingdom—was potentially 
attainable by both the lucky and the unlucky. So for Augustine, life on Earth was a kind of Real 
Hell, but a life lived correctly could lead to Real Paradise in Heaven. This dour view of our 
prospects for a good life on Earth persisted as the dominant Christian view for hundreds of years, 
and only lost its standing when another great synthesizer of theology and Ancient Greek 
philosophy reconsidered our chances for earthly happiness (McMahon, 2006).  
 
Spiritual well-being on Earth 
Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE), combined insights from Augustine and Aristotle 
to emphasize the dual benefits of living well; imperfect beatitude, a positive but imperfect kind 
of well-being available on Earth, and perfect beatitude, a perfect kind of well-being that is only 
available in Heaven. Following Aristotle, Aquinas argued that the contemplation of truth is the 
highest good (or virtue) for intelligent animals (McInerny, 1993). More specifically, and unlike 
Aristotle, Aquinas referred to the perfect contemplation of truth as perfect beatitude, and 
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described it as “seeing” God directly with one’s soul, and experiencing “perfect pleasure—a 
more perfect delight of the senses than that which animals enjoy, since the intellect is higher than 
the senses” (Aquinas, 1988, book 3, chap. 48). So for Aquinas, perfect beatitude and the perfect 
contemplation of truth is more about knowing God through direct experience, then through 
rationally thinking about God’s truths as set down in scripture.  
Also following Aristotle, whom Aquinas referred to as simply “the philosopher” 
(McMahon, 2006, p.127), Aquinas held that humans cannot hope to achieve godlike or perfect 
contemplation of truth on Earth. However, and moving away from the teachings of Aristotle 
here, Aquinas believed that higher, but still imperfect, contemplation was achieved by following 
the teachings of Jesus, and that perfect contemplation could only be achieved through the grace 
of God. God may show his grace by blessing the righteous with the religious virtues of charity, 
hope, and faith, thereby enabling them access to Heaven and the experience of perfect beatitude 
(perfect contemplation of truth) in union with God. So for Aquinas, true well-being is 
otherworldly, but we can also achieve an imperfect spiritual well-being on Earth. 
The most notable difference between Aquinas and Augustine is that Aquinas saw the 
extent of the immediate benefits of following the dictates of the church that Augustine did not. 
Aquinas thought that life on Earth could fall somewhere in between Real Paradise and Real Hell 
for those willing to live well, that is to live a moral life in accordance with the right religious 
doctrines. This difference in view marks a steady change in western thought from passively 
accepting earthly suffering—which was viewed as necessary for salvation or at least 
inescapable—to viewing earthly suffering as a harmful thing that should be avoided where 
possible.  
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Earthly happiness from a religious perspective 
The Aquinian notion that some kind of positive, but imperfect, well-being can be 
achieved on Earth by living a morally good life in accordance with religious teachings was 
adopted by many important thinkers through the early modern period. For example, the key 
enlightenment figure, John Locke (1632–1704 CE), who famously espoused the individual right 
to pursue happiness, hoped that people would use such a right to tread a Christian path to 
imperfect happiness on Earth and perfect happiness in Heaven. Locke’s liberalism was motivated 
by his understanding that people have different tastes (“Cheese or lobsters, . . .though very 
agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive”; Locke, 
1975, book 2, chap. 21, sec. 55). He argued that forcing a particular notion of the greatest good 
on a group of people detracts from the freedom of all to pursue their own notion of well-being, 
and particularly punishes those whose view of the good life is markedly different from that of the 
majority (Schneewind, 1994). So, Locke advised that governments should provide their citizens 
with the necessary freedoms to pursue their own brand of happiness. Nevertheless, Locke 
thought that the offerings of Heaven will suit everyone’s palate (Locke, 1975), making religious 
freedoms particularly important. 
Despite this similarity with Aquinas, Locke had a different view of the nature of earthly 
well-being. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke (1975) described earthly 
well-being as happiness, constituted by a life of many pleasurable satisfactions and few painful 
dissatisfactions. Locke argued that experiences and predictions of pleasure and pain effectively 
drew us around the world by instilling desires in us. He described a cycle in which uneasy desire 
leads to pleasurable satisfaction which, in turn, leads to a new uneasy desire, i.e., what some 
people now call the hedonic treadmill (Smith, 2014). For Locke, this cycle of desires was 
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inexorable for all people because either the current unease-causing desire is pleasurably satisfied, 
in which case a new unease-causing desire looms into consciousness, or the current unsatisfied 
desire eventually fades from consciousness as it is replaced by a new unease-causing desire. 
However, because different people experience more or less pleasure and pain from the same 
stimulus, people tend to be drawn in many directions and develop idiosyncratic views on what 
will provide them with a good life. For Locke, predictions of pleasure and pain are useful guides 
in this way, as they illuminate each individual’s path to happiness. Indeed, believing both our 
ability to reason and our experiences of pleasure and pain to be God-given, Locke concluded that 
God wanted us to be happy on Earth, and gave us the tools we needed to achieve earthly 
happiness (McMahon, 2006). Locke was concerned, however, that people too often made the 
mistake of failing to use their reason by neglecting the immense pleasures of Heaven when 
presented with opportunities for immediate, but immoral, pleasures. For Locke then, well-being 
is happiness and happiness can be found in Heaven and, to a lesser degree, on Earth.  
This more Lockean view of the positive life available on Earth as a pleasurable one, 
rather than a contemplative one, marks the gradual resurgence of the association of pleasure and 
happiness with well-being in the west. Indeed, of the range of contemporary religious views in 
the west, the ones that promote the pursuit of a moralistic, but pleasurable, happiness on Earth 
seem to be becoming more popular than those which advocate suffering on Earth for the sake of 
perfect well-being in Heaven (Ehrenreich, 2009). As we shall see, the enlightenment, and its 
attendant questioning of religion, weakens the dominance of the view that true or perfect well-
being is not available on Earth. However, many people in the west, and especially the United 
States, still claim to hold something like this view (Exline, 2003). Similarly, being able to 
practice their religion is still important for many people in the west, demonstrating that spiritual 
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well-being is an important component of earthly well-being for some western people (Cohen, 
2002), although not as important a component as it is in the east (Joshanloo, 2014). Despite the 
superiority of Heavenly well-being professed by some, our inability to infallibly know whether 
heaven exists while we live on Earth makes spiritual well-being on Earth seem like the better 
social indicator for any contemporary group of individuals.  
In this section, we saw how for Augustine true well-being is full possession of God, 
something that is only available in Heaven. Similarly, Aquinas held that being in Heaven with 
God was the ultimate positive experience. However, unlike Augustine, Aquinas thought that 
similar, but less exalted experiences were available on Earth for those who followed the religious 
path toward God. Finally, Locke argued that, while true well-being did reside only in heaven, 
Earthly well-being was characterized by the pleasant satisfaction of our desires. 
 
Happiness 
During the Enlightenment, amassing and communicating knowledge became seen as an 
important route to securing well-being. Indeed, if the enlightenment had a motto, it might have 
been what was engraved on the 1772 edition of the Encyclopédie: “If there is something you 
know, communicate it. If there is something you don’t know, search for it.” Following the 
tradition of many of the ancient writers, it was recognized that knowledge and effective 
education to distribute that knowledge could promote well-being by debunking harmful 
superstitious beliefs, promoting material living conditions, improving healthcare, and even 
breaking the bonds of tyrannical power (McMahon, 2006). It was also common during this 
period to view happiness as well-being. As we shall see, some disregarded any notion of spiritual 
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well-being, and focused on the pursuit of personal happiness or public happiness, while others 
worried about the tensions between personal and public happiness.  
More specifically, the following views will be explained. That the possibilities for well-
being are limited to happiness on Earth, and that happiness is a preponderance of pleasure over 
pain (La Mettrie and the Utilitarians). That true happiness is a tranquil state, much more 
dependent on avoiding pain than experiencing pleasure, and one that hard to come for the greedy 
and the immoral (Smith, Rousseau, and Jefferson). That public happiness should be maximized 
(the Utilitarians). And, the view that some strategies for increasing public happiness could make 
it harder for individuals to achieve a tranquil and moralized personal (Smith, Rousseau, and 
Jefferson). 
 
Sensory pleasure without religion or morality 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751 CE) trained and worked as a physician, which 
led him to perform many operations and autopsies on humans and other animals (McMahon, 
2006). Struck by both the similarity of human and non-human animal organs and the mechanistic 
nature of these organs and their subcomponents, La Mettrie argued that, just like non-human 
animals, humans do not need souls to animate them because they are effectively “self-winding 
machine[s]” (La Mettrie, 1994, p.30). In Treatise on the Soul, La Mettrie (1996a) argued that, 
just as in non-human animals, pleasure and pain, which combine to make up happiness, are the 
motivating forces of the human machine. As a result of these beliefs, La Mettrie saw happiness 
as the natural state of all animals: “Nature has created us uniquely to be happy, yes every one of 
us, from the worm who crawls, to the eagle who loses himself in the clouds” (1994, p.53). La 
Mettrie was also a prudential hedonist; he viewed pleasure as the ultimate good in life. And, 
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although Epicurus was a major influence on him, La Mettrie understood pleasure as sensory 
pleasure—luscious experiences of delight that arise from the arousal and satisfaction of sensual 
desires (Thomson, 1996). Indeed, La Mettrie saw the Lockean cycle of ‘desire to pleasurable 
satisfaction to new desire’ as our greatest gift from nature because it provided constant 
opportunities to experience the pleasures of satisfaction and anticipation.  
Believing pleasure to be the source of well-being, and having rejected the existence of 
immortal souls, La Mettrie saw no need for heaven or God either. La Mettrie rejected the 
existence of heaven and God because he believed that nothing could exist outside of the physical 
universe. Although anti-religious sentiment was growing during this stage of the Enlightenment, 
La Mettrie was one of the first to challenge the contemporary theistic beliefs so strongly, and 
perhaps provided the most articulate discussion of the implications of these anti-theistic claims 
for human well-being (McMahon, 2006). For La Mettrie, the implications were clear; even the 
religions that did not demand suffering on Earth still required at least occasional toiling and 
foregoing of pleasure in this life to ensure true happiness in the afterlife, but the promises of 
religion were empty, so foregoing pleasure on Earth would mean missing out on the only chance 
one has for happiness. Adherents’ religious beliefs and voluntary moral restrictions were making 
a Fool’s Hell out of what might be a Real Paradise. 
In addition to completely rejecting any God-given aspect of the good life, La Mettrie’s 
hedonistic views also broke with one of the oldest traditions of scholarship on well-being; he 
pointed out that virtue was not a necessary or singularly important route to happiness. Depending 
on their character, La Mettrie (1987) argued in Anti-Seneca, some individuals would be happiest 
wallowing in filth, some reveling in depraved debauchery, and others committing evil deeds: 
“Happiness is individual and particular, and may be found in the absence of virtue and even in 
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crime” (La Mettrie, 1987, p.263) Even more antithetical to dominant historical views of the good 
life, in System of Epicurus La Mettrie (1996b) disapproved of more than the necessary use of 
reason because he thought conscious deliberation diminished the capacity to experience 
concurrent pleasure. His disregard for these long-established views about well-being might 
explain why secular and religious critics alike openly mocked La Mettrie upon hearing that he 
might have died young from hedonistic over-indulgence; they were pleased that this peddler of 
repugnant ideas got his just deserts (McMahon, 2006). So for La Mettrie, well-being is secular 
and amoral sensory pleasure.  
 
Public and personal happiness 
 Like La Mettrie, several other Enlightenment thinkers began arguing that happiness on 
Earth was the most important good for humans, and perhaps even our natural state. Voltaire 
claimed that “Paradise is where I am” (2003, p.295) and that “the great and only concern is to be 
happy” (c.f. Craveri, 2005, p.258). Adam Smith argued that happiness is our “natural” or “usual” 
state (1982, p.149). And, Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw happiness as the natural end of “every 
being which senses” (Rousseau, 1997a, p.442). In effect, the Enlightenment saw a transition in 
the ultimate question from the religious ‘How can I be saved?’ to the pragmatic ‘How can I be 
happy?’ (Porter 2000). But the Enlightenment was also a time of social and political change and, 
as such, some thinkers were also asking ‘How can we be happy?’. Several Enlightenment 
thinkers offered answers to this question, although many also saw the inherent difficulty in 
bringing about both private and public happiness.  
 The Enlightenment saw the fruits of the industrial revolution begin to ripen alongside 
advances in agriculture and trade (McMahon, 1996). As a result, wealth above subsistence levels 
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was spreading to an increasingly large proportion of society and the associated disposable 
income, and increase in markets replete with a variety of goods led to the “birth of consumer 
society” (McKendrick, Brewer, & Plumb, 1985). A growing economy and more readily available 
goods would be viewed by most people (and especially economists) as beneficial for public 
happiness because these things can increase people’s ability to satisfy their most essential needs 
for things like food, clothing and shelter. It should be no surprise, then, that Adam Smith was a 
great proponent of the commercialization that was occurring during the Enlightenment. 
Adam Smith (1723–1790 CE) believed that governments should be valued to the extent 
that they “promote the happiness of those who live under them”, since that “is their sole use and 
end” (1982, p.185). Apparently believing that a society is minimally the sum total of its 
inhabitants, he declared that no “society can be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater 
part of the members are poor and miserable” (1981, p.96). So, Smith argued for governments to 
aim for economic progress because increases in wealth would reduce suffering. In addition to 
this benefit, Smith approved of the economic trends of the Enlightenment so strongly because he 
thought that they were important drivers of security and liberty (Smith, 1981, p.412). Rasmussen 
(2006) has argued that Smith likely thought of increasing security and liberty for people as the 
best way to improve well-being because living in a “continual state of war with their neighbors, 
and of servile dependency on their superiors” (Smith, 1981, p.412) were causes of great suffering 
to people. Nevertheless, Smith was concerned that while commercialized societies could raise 
living standards and reduce misery (to the benefit of public happiness), they also exacerbated an 
old barrier to attaining personal happiness.  
Essentially, Smith worried that the frivolous temptations of consumerism would appeal to 
our natural “desire of bettering our condition” that “comes with us from the womb”, and that we 
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would succumb, chasing the illusion of happiness instead of enjoying the happiness that might 
already be at hand (1981, p.341). Smith had a very different view of happiness from La Mettrie, 
describing it as a state of “tranquility and enjoyment”, and as our “natural” or “usual” state—
what we revert to when our desires, fears, and anxieties are resolved (1982, p.149). Smith’s view 
of happiness was more like a combination of the views of Epicurus and the Stoics; he viewed 
happiness as a rare but blissful state of being free of (especially psychological) perturbations, not 
wanting for anything, and as inherently bound up with being virtuous. Also, like Epicurus, Smith 
saw pain as more important than pleasure: “Pain… almost always, depresses us much more 
below the… natural state of our happiness, than [pleasure] ever rises us above it” (1982, p.44). 
Smith also viewed wealth as much more important for mitigating pain than promoting pleasure, 
since between the natural state of our happiness “and the highest pitch of human prosperity, the 
interval is but a trifle; [but] between it and the lowest depth of misery the distance is immense 
and prodigious” (1982, p.45). So for Smith, once a basic-need-satisfying level of material wealth 
is reached, additional money (or power) makes little difference to happiness. 
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith (1982, p.113) sets out what can help people 
achieve the “inward tranquility and self-satisfaction” of happiness. Smith thought “warranted 
praise from others and self-approbation” (Rasmussen, 2006, p.310) are the best sources of 
happiness because “the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being 
loved” (Smith, 1982, p.41). Naturally, virtuous behavior goes much further to engender true 
appreciation from others than amassing wealth and power. Given all of these views, Smith 
concludes: “What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, 
and has a clear conscience? To one in this situation, all accessions of fortune may properly be 
said to be superfluous” (1982, p.45). For Smith, wealth or economic well-being was not a 
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constituent, but a determinant of well-being, and one that loses most or all of its well-being 
generating effect at the level at which basic needs are satisfied. So, while Smith was a proponent 
of economic growth for reasons of public happiness (security and liberty from suffering), he was 
concerned that the resulting consumer society might lead individuals to forego the happiness that 
was readily available to them in favor of the illusory happiness of wealth and power.  
 A contemporary of Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778 CE) held several similar 
views, including on what happiness is and that happiness is our natural end. Furthermore, and 
contrary to La Mettrie, Rousseau was adamant that “Happiness is not pleasure” (Rousseau, 1994, 
p.40). Rousseau argued that pleasure could not be equivalent to happiness or well-being because 
it would be absurd to put so much value in “a fleeting state which leaves our hearts still empty 
and anxious, either regretting something that is past or desiring something that is yet to come” 
(1979b, p.88). For Rousseau, happiness was “a single lasting state” (1979b, p.88) in which 
Locke’s uneasiness was never felt, in which one was completely immersed in one’s own 
momentary existence, without a care in the world (cf, the concept of flow in Csikszentmihalyi 
(1997). Like Smith, Rousseau’s conception of the best possible life was more similar to the 
Ancient Greeks than most of his contemporaries because he viewed happiness as a kind of 
permanent self-sufficiency; a state in which one wants for nothing (Rousseau, 1979b). It is no 
wonder then, that pleasure was insufficient for Rousseau. As La Mettrie would have attested, 
there is no amount of pleasure that couldn’t be improved by adding a little more. 
 Compared to Smith, Rousseau was less positive about the economic trends of his day. 
Rousseau viewed maintaining happiness in a world that constantly presented new desirable 
possibilities and accoutrements as an extremely difficult task: “As soon as man’s needs exceed 
his faculties and the objects of his desire expand and multiply, he must either remain eternally 
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unhappy or seek a new form of being from which he can draw the resources he no longer finds in 
himself” (1994, p.82). Rousseau was recognizing what Epicurus and the Stoics had argued for 
before him; if well-being requires something outside of oneself, then any brief achievement of 
happiness or success is so tenuous that it brings anxiety about losing the new-found good along 
with itself. In particular, well-being based on external goods (e.g. power and wealth) was 
considered extremely tenuous because the Gods or other people were liable to disrupt their good 
fortune (Joshanloo et al., forthcoming). But Rousseau did not believe Gods would undo earthly 
good fortune, and he thought that his theory of social contract might allow us to ‘form a new 
kind of being’ by providing a blueprint for building a society stable enough to vastly reduce the 
anxiety caused by living in close proximity to our fellow humans. 
  In The Social Contract, Rousseau (1782) argued for various forms of democracy based 
on the idea that the only legitimate subjugation to power is voluntary subjugation, and only then 
when the volunteer is also a part of that greater power. In order for Rousseau’s social contract 
idea to work, everyone had to give themselves entirely to the state, which meant to consciously 
become a part of one new being—the society—and to act accordingly (i.e. with society’s 
interests in mind). In such an ideal society, force would only have to be used by the whole on the 
few if the few had not fully given themselves to the state and were attempting to free-ride on the 
many. With this security from oppression obtained, Rousseau thought that the benefits of large-
scale community living might outweigh the desire-enticing consumerist problems that came 
along with it: 
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable 
change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his 
actions the morality they had formerly lacked. … Although, in this state, he 
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deprives himself of some advantages which he got from nature, he gains in return 
others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so 
extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted... (1782, Book 
1, sect. 8) 
Furthermore, Rousseau (1994) believed that fully giving oneself to society would make 
achieving the tranquil state of happiness easier because it prevents the disquieting internal 
tensions that result from being caught between our natural tendencies and desires on the one 
hand and our duties and the watchful gaze of social institutions on the other hand. Even for those 
who did fully give themselves to the state, however, Rousseau believed that the government 
could not force its citizens to be happy, concluding that: “the best [government] puts them in a 
position to be happy if they are reasonable” (1994, p.41).  
 Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826 CE) and the signatories to the Declaration of 
Independence were also aware of the importance of happiness:  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and 
to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect 
their Safety and Happiness.  
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This preamble to the Declaration uses the language of rights, popularized during the 
Enlightenment, and essentially claims that, as willed by God, everyone is born with the freedom 
to pursue happiness in whatever way they wish. Based on this, the Declaration states that free 
individuals may choose to create a government so as to further protect these rights, and that if the 
government is not allowing the pursuit of happiness as it should, then the people can dissolve or 
restructure it. These ideas, perhaps without the religious root, have doubtlessly played an 
important role in shaping the widespread contemporary western belief that governments should 
arrange institutions and manage conditions in a way that makes it easy for people to pursue 
happiness. But, which kind of happiness? 
 McMahon (2006, pp.330–331) has argued that Jefferson intended the newly anointed 
citizens of the United States of America to pursue both public and personal happiness; he hoped, 
like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, that they would realize that virtuous and socially beneficent 
behavior would engender happiness in the individual as well as for her society. According to 
McMahon, Jefferson and his colleagues believed that many of the main themes we have 
discussed here would help prevent individuals from pursuing happiness in the way Smith feared 
they might in a consumer society, and preventing happiness as a result: “In religion, in classical 
virtue, in the education of reason, and in the public-mindedness of the moral sense, Jefferson and 
his contemporaries saw the forces that would perform this essential task, ensuring that the pursuit 
of private pleasures did not veer off the thoroughfare of public good” (McMahon, 2006, p. 330). 
Unfortunately, Smith’s concerns appear to have been realized in the nation that rushed to 
economic dominance because “No one could work harder to be happy” than its citizens, who 
could not relax “for fear of missing the shortest cut leading to happiness’ (Tocqueville, 1988, 
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Vol.1, p.243). Still today, the United States is viewed as the land of abundance, but if happiness 
surveys are anything to go by, it could not rightfully be viewed as the land of happiness.  
 
Utilitarianism 
 Utilitarians also thought they had the answer to the question of how to engender public 
happiness, but they took a more direct route than that taken by Jefferson. Like many 
Enlightenment thinkers, Utilitarians were disposed to pronouncements such as, “Every authority 
that is not exercised for the happiness of all can only be founded on imposture and force” 
(Chastellux, 1772, c.f. McMahon, 2006, p.217). These pronouncements were based on the 
increasingly widespread Enlightenment belief that the proper role of legislation was to benefit 
people, but also on the still contentious belief that happiness (variously defined, if at all) on Earth 
was, ultimately, the only thing of value for people. Based on these premises, Jeremy Bentham 
(1748–1832 CE) set out the principle of utility (more commonly known as the greatest happiness 
principle) to discern whether the actions of individuals and governments are moral: “By the 
principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action 
whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of 
the party whose interest is in question… I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only 
of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government” (Bentham, 2000, 
p.14). 
Essentially, both individuals and governments morally ought to act in whichever ways 
seem likely to bring about the most happiness for everyone concerned. The motivation behind 
utilitarianism is simple enough; if every person and institution acted in a way that created the 
most happiness, then there would be much more happiness to go around. Furthermore, since 
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Utilitarians also believe that everyone’s happiness should be afforded equal moral value 
(Weijers, 2011), the gains in happiness should not be concentrated among the elite few. In this 
way, Utilitarians might be thought of as aiming for Real Paradise on Earth by encouraging 
individuals and institutions to create as much happiness as possible. However, since happiness 
was an entirely internal state for most Utilitarians, they would prefer a Fool’s Paradise to Real 
Paradise if there was more pleasure to be had in the former. Nevertheless, these moral elements 
of utilitarianism made it much more palatable than La Mettrie’s egoistic view of pursuing one’s 
own happiness. After all, who could argue with more happiness for everyone? Well, that depends 
at least on how ‘happiness’ is understood. 
Most Utilitarians believe that happiness consists in a preponderance of pleasure over pain 
(Weijers, 2011). While it might seem myopic to account for all that is good for people in terms 
of pleasure, Utilitarians usually understand pleasure broadly, so that it includes psychological 
pleasures as well as sensual bodily pleasures. Indeed, Bentham (2000) understood pleasure 
synonymously with satisfaction, bliss, ecstasy, well-being, and 50 other terms that roughly 
equated to feeling good. Since Bentham (2000) was a quantitative hedonist, increasing happiness 
meant simply increasing the quantity of pleasure or decreasing the quantity of pain, along the 
lines suggested in Plato’s Protagoras. Bentham (2000) laid out in detail the aspects of pleasure 
that contribute to its quantity. In essence, the quantity of pleasure felt at any moment could be 
calculated by summing the intensity of each of one’s concurrent pleasures, and the same for pain. 
Then, momentary happiness would be the total concurrent pleasure less the total concurrent pain. 
Notably, Bentham’s quantitative hedonism allowed pleasure from different sources to be of 
equivalent value if they had the same intensity: “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal 
value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnishes more 
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pleasure, it is more valuable than either.” (Bentham, 1825, p.206). Failing to distinguish a 
difference between the value of sensual pleasures on the one hand and of moral and intellectual 
pleasures on the other led Bentham and other quantitative hedonists to be accused of peddling a 
philosophy of swine (Weijers, 2011). Even Bentham’s protégé criticized him on this point. 
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873 CE), who studied under and was Godson to Bentham, used 
a different notion of pleasure in his version of utilitarianism. Mill (1957) developed a qualitative 
hedonism, which was similar to Bentham’s quantitative hedonism, except that it also took the 
quality of pleasures into account when calculating their value. For Mill, the quality of a pleasure 
had to do with how bodily or cerebral it was; bodily or lower pleasures, such as from eating, 
were of a lower quality than higher pleasures, such as from acting virtuously or listening to 
opera. The following famous, but often misquoted, statement from Mill demonstrates this view: 
“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only 
know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides” (Mill, 
1957, p. 9). For Utilitarians then, well-being is happiness, understood as a preponderance of 
pleasure over pain (broadly construed). 
For the thinkers in this section, well-being is Earthly happiness. La Mettrie and the 
Utilitarians viewed as happiness as a preponderance of pleasure over pain, but they had differing 
views about what kinds of pleasure are more valuable. Smith, Rousseau, and Jefferson held more 
tranquil and moralized conceptions of happiness that focused more on avoiding pain than 
experiencing pleasure. All of these thinkers were concerned with increasing happiness in the 
public sphere, but it was mainly Smith, Rousseau, and Jefferson that saw how some strategies for 
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increasing public happiness could make it harder for individuals to achieve a tranquil and 
moralized happiness. 
 
Loftier Goals 
Although Mill’s qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism was more acceptable than 
Bentham’s quantitative version, many critics still worried that happiness (whether defined as 
pleasure, satisfaction, or tranquility) was not the be all and end all of a good life. As we shall see, 
critics clamored for morality, community, meaning, religion, and authenticity to be considered as 
essential aspects of well-being as they had in ancient times. More specifically, in this section, the 
following views will be explained. That there is more to well-being than happiness and that, as 
such, public happiness should not be the goal of society (Carlyle, Weber, and Huxley). That 
moral, social, and religious ends were more appropriate goals for public policy (Carlyle and 
Weber). And, the view that meaningfulness and authenticity were better public goals than 
happiness (Huxley). 
 
Morality, community, meaningful work, and God 
Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881 CE) lamented the public pursuit of happiness, shaped by 
Utilitarians in Great Britain, decrying utilitarianism for failing to appreciate the differences 
between humans and beasts (Carlyle, 1965). Carlyle also attacked the economic markets inspired 
by Smith for destroying morality: “Our life is not a mutual helpfulness, but rather, cloaked under 
due laws-of-war, named ‘fair competition’ and so forth, it is mutual hostility” (1965, p.148). At 
heart, Carlyle was bemoaning the past 200 years of earthly happiness worship that had been 
eroding traditional values since Locke suggested that God wanted us to be happy on Earth. 
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Carlyle pined for a return of the days when community, meaningful work, and an intimate sense 
of God were the values that people held highest (McMahon, 2006). 
After visiting the United States and observing the forefront of capitalism and 
consumerism, Max Weber (1864–1920 CE) held many of Carlyle’s worries. By this time, 
Smith’s markets had done much to raise living standards, but the cost of this progress, according 
to Weber, was a disastrous shift in societal goals. The happiness that was being pursued had lost 
its connotations of virtue, religion, and meaning, and replaced them with wealth. To an outsider, 
like Weber was, it looked like the American dream was to work very hard in order to pursue the 
greatest good of wealth. In Weber’s view, Smith’s greatest fear about the commercialization of 
society had been realized: “Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the 
ultimate purpose of his life” (Weber, 1976, p.53). Like Carlyle before him, Weber lamented what 
he saw as an erosion of moral and religious values in the United States, where “the pursuit of 
wealth… [had] become associated with purely mundane passions, which actually gave it the 
character of sport” (Weber, 1976, p.181). Weber observed people working out of a sense of duty, 
but without knowing to what or whom the duty was owed; they just worked out of blind devotion 
to work itself. Without its religious and moral motivations, Weber thought both work and non-
work activities were meaningless. Targeting the goal of public happiness (with its strong 
materialistic connotation) as part of the problem behind these events, Weber suggested better 
legislation would focus on what is valuable in humans: “I believe that we must renounce human 
happiness as a goal of social legislation. We want something else and can only want something 
else. We want to cultivate and support what appears to us valuable in man: his personal 
responsibility, his deep drive towards higher things, towards the spiritual and moral values of 
mankind…” (Weber, 1804/1993, pp. 339–340; c.f. McMahon, 2006, p.359).  
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 Both Carlyle and Weber articulated views of well-being that ran contrary to the 
increasingly happiness- and wealth-centric views of their times, but neither were confident that 
there was much hope for a return to the older conceptions of well-being that stressed the 
importance of virtue and religion. Weber warned that everything “opposed to the culture of 
capitalism was going to be demolished with irresistible force” (c.f. Mommsen, 2000, p. 105). 
What Carlyle in particular mused over, although without much success, was the problem of how 
to get people to realize that there was more to life than happiness as Utilitarians defined it 
(McMahon, 2006). Carlyle and Weber seemed to understand well-being as a life full of morality, 
community, meaningful work, and God.  
 
Unhappiness, authenticity, and meaning 
In the process of writing Brave New World, Aldous Huxley (1894–1963 CE) came to 
share Carlyle’s belief that happiness as pleasant satisfaction or tranquility must not be our main 
personal or societal goal (Huxley, 1959). In Brave New World, Huxley (1932) depicts an 
advanced society that has taken the greatest happiness principle to its logical extreme; all of its 
institutions and technologies are geared toward engendering a passive, contented, and pleasant 
populace. One of the most important technologies put to use in service of these goals is soma.  
Soma, is a readily available drug that is used as a reward to control the lower castes and 
as an antidote for whatever psychological ailments the upper castes might experience. A small 
dose relieves minor psychological perturbations and produces pleasant feelings. A large dose 
provides a soma holiday—a complete escape from present troubles into a joyous dreamlike state. 
As explained by World Controller Mustapha Mond, soma not only makes the imbiber feel 
happier and less anxious, it also helps virtues to shine: “There's always soma to calm your anger, 
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to reconcile you to your enemies, to make you patient and long-suffering. In the past you could 
only accomplish these things by making a great effort and after years of hard moral training. 
Now, you swallow two or three half-gramme tablets, and there you are. Anybody can be virtuous 
now. ... Christianity without tears -- that's what soma is” (Huxley, 1932, p.238). 
As well as making individuals happy, soma’s placating and moralizing effects also help 
keep society peaceful and stable, as Mustapha Mond makes clear: “The world's stable now. 
People are happy; they get what they want, and they never want what they can't get… And if 
anything should go wrong, there's soma” (Huxley, 1932, p. 220). In this respect, soma ensures 
both the public security that Smith and Rousseau desired and the personal tranquility that results 
from being free of fear and anxieties. In the appropriate doses, soma also provides the luscious 
pleasures that La Mettrie desired. Mill would likely not have held the lower pleasure provided by 
soma in very high esteem, but if quantitative hedonistic Utilitarians like Bentham were true to 
their theory, they would certainly legislate in favor of this happiness increasing and pain 
decreasing drug. 
Of course, what Huxley achieves in Brave New World is to help us imagine what society 
might be like if particular conceptions of well-being are used as the goal of society. Indeed, 
Huxley himself was worried that the dominant conceptions of well-being in the west would 
result in the kind of society his story was based on (Huxley, 1959). Even though the offerings in 
this futuristic society seem to satisfy the well-being requirements of many of the thinkers 
discussed in this chapter, most would likely balk at the opportunity to live in such a dystopic 
society. But why? 
A key character in Brave New World shares the view that the happiness-oriented society 
is dystopic. John the Savage was raised on a reserve for the humans who didn’t wish to join the 
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happiness revolution. On the reserve, all modern technology had been lost or abandoned and life 
had reverted to a tribal and spiritual affair. John was unusual because he was born to and raised 
by a civilized human who, after becoming pregnant, was left at the reserve. As a result, he was 
fairly intelligent and could speak the language of civilized society. A certain turn of events leads 
John to experience the happiness-centric society first hand, and he does not like it. In the end, 
John voices his concerns about the brave new world through a recognition of what he wants that 
it cannot provide:  
'I'm claiming the right to be unhappy.' 
'Not to mention the right to grow old and ugly and impotent; the right to have 
syphilis and cancer; the right to have too little to eat; the right to be lousy; the 
right to live in constant apprehension of what may happen to-morrow; the right to 
catch typhoid; the right to be tortured by unspeakable pains of every kind.' 
(Huxley, 1932, p.240). 
John wanted a real and interesting life, replete with the whole range of states that will be 
experienced in an unexpected way. There is something very meaningless and inauthentic about a 
somafied life. And certainly it lacks drama or a narrative worth retelling. Since Huxley began to 
increasingly identify with John (Huxley, 1959), it is clear that he believed well-being to require 
meaning and authenticity that was impossible in a life filled with only happiness. Indeed, most 
readers of Brave New World are likely left with the impression that the happy people in Huxley’s 
fantastic society are living in a Fool’s Paradise, since they lack the basic freedom to be unhappy, 
to find their own way, and to pursue a real and authentically meaningful life. Huxley viewed 
well-being as a meaningful and authentic life, which may well require unhappiness. 
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 In this section, Carlyle, Weber, and Huxley are all arguing that there is more to well-
being than happiness and that, as such, public happiness should not be the goal of society. In 
particular, Carlyle and Weber thought that moral, social, and religious goals were more 
appropriate. In a similar vein, Huxley argued that meaningfulness and authenticity were better 
goals than happiness. 
 
Summary and discussion 
As we have seen, there have been a wide variety of conceptions of well-being throughout the 
history of the west. While some conceptions seem to have died completely, many of the oldest 
conceptions went in and out of fashion and still inform contemporary views. In this section we 
very briefly, broadly, and roughly describe the major trends over the last two and a half thousand 
years. A schematic visual representation of this summary can be seen in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2: Schematic Outline of Western Views of Well-Being from Ancient to Modern 
Times 
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 The Ancient view of well-being as excellent personal traits and aristocratic trappings was 
less prevalent in the middle ages, but resurged somewhat in modern times. In the middle ages, 
excellent personal traits were mainly replaced with religious virtues. And, in modern times the 
emphasis seems to have shifted more to the possession of wealth and power, and away from 
being a morally good person.  
 Ancient views of well-being as some sort of harmony mainly grew out of favor, except 
for during the Enlightenment and the preceding century, when the balance between public and 
personal happiness was being discussed, and perhaps in notions of internal psychological 
harmony, such as in Smith’s view of personal happiness as pleasant tranquility. 
Pleasure, a dark horse in Ancient times and through to the end of the middle ages, was 
usually seen as a positive feature in a life, but never a very important or worthy one. Yet, from 
the times of Locke and La Mettrie onward, the spreading of more secular world views, and more 
scientific views of the mind, appear to have made valuing pleasure more acceptable. The height 
of pleasure’s role in conceptions of well-being seems to have been at the time of British 
Empiricism, when Bentham and his utilitarian colleagues held both academic and political sway 
(Sumner, 1996). Pleasure still plays an important role in conceptions of well-being today, 
although usually as part of happiness, which tends to be understood as “satisfaction with life and 
a preponderance of positive over negative emotions” (Joshanloo & Weijers, 2014, p.718). 
Religion and in particular Christianity, which swept to dominance after the fall of the 
Roman Empire, only began to lose sway over philosophers and non-philosophers alike during the 
Enlightenment. As science continues to reveal the universe’s secrets, and as economic progress 
continues to reduce the number of people struggling, religious beliefs and religious conceptions 
of well-being continue to fall slowly out of favor in the west (Diener, Tay, & Myers, 2011). 
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However, moderate religious views of well-being, such as Locke’s, probably remain important 
as significant numbers of people still report being religious in many western nations. 
Happiness, usually understood in the relatively utilitarian way as satisfaction with life 
and a preponderance of positive over negative emotions, has played only a very minor role in the 
history of well-being (despite many translations of Ancient texts appropriating the word) up until 
the Enlightenment. In contemporary western society, happiness is possibly the most common 
understanding of well-being, or at least the most commonly named component of it. However, 
how to define happiness is still hotly contested, especially since it has become a synonym of 
well-being in common usage. For these reasons, measures of happiness that are worded very 
generally, or other generally worded evaluations of life as a whole, might best represent the 
contemporary western view of well-being. 
Despite this, and in line with Rousseau and Jefferson, the idea that a government would 
attempt to force people to be happy is as largely reviled today as it was then. This at least partly 
explains our revulsion at Huxley’s brave new world, in which society was arranged in such a 
way that there was literally no right to be unhappy, and no chance to lead a meaningful 
existence. Furthermore, the contemporary idea of governments measuring happiness and using 
happiness research to guide policy is likely unpopular among the older generations partly 
because their longer view of history has taught them being forced to be free is a much better 
guarantor of their well-being than any roughshod attempt to force them to be happy. State force 
has been abused so many times in the past (and even still now), that many people prefer that their 
governments provide them with the tools they need to pursue their own view of well-being in 
their own way, a way that is meaningful to them. For this reason, useful proxy measures of well-
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being might be thought to be measures of health, education, civil and political liberties, and 
wealth, since these are the basic enablers of the freedom to pursue well-being in all of its forms.  
Throughout this chapter, we have referred the four-part taxonomy of the objective and 
subjective qualities of life (displayed in Figure 2.1). The most important point to be made 
regarding this framework is that the classical notion of a Fool’s Paradise, which survives today, 
requires at least the sort of two-variable model mentioned in the first paragraph. This notion is 
based on the common sense view that there is a real world, however roughly apprehended, and 
that there are good reasons for believing that some perceptions, thoughts, feelings and actions are 
more appropriate than others in that sort of world. As the remnants of the works of ancient 
authors reveal, and as one would easily discover by examining the works of contemporary 
authors, the common sense view of the human condition is not universally appreciated and 
accepted. In particular, some scholars are troubled by the fact that a person’s personal 
assessments of his or her life (i.e., self-reported health) may conflict with relatively objective 
assessments (e.g., measures of blood pressure and heart-valve functioning). While anyone with 
any democratic sensitivity would grant that each person’s assessment of his or her own life 
should be accorded some privileged status, it is far from obvious that such privilege should over-
ride all other considerations.  
The best way to address the problem of what to say when relatively objective conditions 
are not consistent with subjective assessments is to claim that normally, or in the standard case, 
objective conditions and subjective assessments are each necessary and jointly provide a clear 
sufficient condition of a life being bad or good, and being regarded as such for good reasons. 
Then, if someone’s perceptions, assessments and actions are inconsistent with relatively 
objective conditions as a result of his or her ignorance, disability, disease, substance abuse or 
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some sort of duress, we are reasonably warranted in over-riding their judgments. As well, if what 
we regard as relatively objective conditions are not as we think they are (which often happens, 
including disagreements among well-informed people), it would be unreasonable to insist that 
our claims about them are true and that we must act accordingly. In both kinds of cases, the 
normal or standard conditions for assuming the necessity of objective conditions and subjective 
assessments are not met. When the normal or standard conditions are not met, we have the 
possibility of a Fool’s Paradise or Fool’s Hell. So we must adjust our judgments to fit these 
cases. Readers may wish to keep this in mind while reading the rest of this volume. 
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